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Fascism was not a Developmental Dictatorship. 
Evidence from Simple Tests 
Roberto Ricciuti ∗ 
Abstract: »Der Faschismus war keine Entwicklungsdiktatur. Ein Nachweis mit 
einfachen Tests«. The economic history literature on Fascism points out that its 
policies were strongly oriented towards capital accumulation. In this paper we 
analyse capital accumulation in Italy between 1881 and 1938 to verify its sta-
bility. If these policies were successful, we should observe a discontinuity in the 
data generation process with respect to the previous period. However, this 
analysis shows that the process is quite stable over time, and possible disconti-
nuities cannot be attributed to the economic policy of the Fascist government. 
Keywords: Capital accumulation, fascism, liberal Italy, AR models. 
1.  Introduction 
Economic theory does not have a clear prediction on the effects of democracy 
on economic growth. On the one hand, a dictatorship may be more favourable 
to growth with respect to democracy because there is lower redistribution and 
consequently lower taxation, which in turn increases investments and capital 
accumulation, one of the neoclassical drivers of economic growth. On the other 
hand, redistribution reduces liquidity constraints and allows individuals poor in 
capital but rich in innovative ideas to implement product and process innova-
tions, which are at the heath of endogenous growth models (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006). At the same time, the empirical literature does not give con-
sistent results (Barro 1996; Persson and Tabellini 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2008; 
Papaioannou and Siouriounis 2008).1  
According to Gregor (1979) fascism (which was in power from 1922 
through 1943) was a developmentalist dictatorship, not differently from social-
ist dictatorships in the same years. His view is opposite to the conventional 
wisdom: “First of all, it can easily be established that Fascism, prior to its ad-
vent to power, advertised a specific program addressed to immediate problems 
that afflicted the national economy. Moreover, Fascism entertained a long-
range economic program that was reasonably well articulated in the doctrinal 
                                                             
∗  Roberto Ricciuti, Department of Economics, University of Verona, Vicolo Campofiore 2, 
37121 Verona, Italy; roberto.ricciuti@univr.it. 
1  For a short review see Nannicini and Ricciuti (2010). 
HSR 39 (2014) 3  │  338 
literature of 1921 and 1922. Furthermore, while it is true that Fascism's imme-
diate, and some considerable part of its more comprehensive programs, were 
not incompatible with the interests of important segments of Italy's economic 
elite, those programs were autonomous, originating among its principal ideo-
logues before allies previously unattached to the movement joined forces with 
Fascism. Whatever accommodation there might have been with the established 
economic interests of the peninsula, this accommodation was a contingent, 
rather than a constituent, characteristic of Fascist economic policy.” 
However, the assessment of this feature is not easy. Analysing ‘quota 90’ 
and the establishment of IRI,2 Cohen (1988) claimed that were not part of an 
intelligent design from the fascist government aimed to economic growth. He 
concluded that Italy showed a rate of growth smaller than other European coun-
tries, and on top of that it had to pay the political cost of a dictatorship. Along the 
same lines, Lyttelton (1988) maintains that the modernization rhetoric appeared 
more important than reality, and economic growth was slower than in the Giolit-
tian age because of the barriers raised towards the international economy. 
The literature on fascist economic policy emphasises the role of capital ac-
cumulation, a reasonable target given the backwardness of the Italian economy 
and, more in general, the features of the economies at that time, when the mod-
ern drivers (human capital, technology) played a limited role. For this reason 
we analyse the dynamics of capital accumulation to assess whether there as 
significant discontinuities – attributable to economic policy – between fascism 
and the previous political regime. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the main features of 
fascist economic policy, whereas Section 3 reviews the cliometric literature of 
the economy during the dictatorship. Section 4 introduces the methodology and 
shows the results. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
2.  Economic Policy during Fascism 
The economic policy of Fascism has been characterised by an attempt to raise 
capital accumulation through an increase in profits. This happened by lowering 
wages3 and through oligopolistic arrangements. Moreover, the import-substi-
tution policy was aimed at enlarging the domestic market for Italian firms, again 
with the objective to raise profits (Fausto 2007). The consequence of these 
                                                             
2  The Institute for Industrial Reconstruction had the mission to buy distressed industrial assets 
from mixed banks in the wake of the Great Depression. 
3  On wages and labour market during Fascism see Sabbatucci Severini and Trento (1975) and 
Zamagni (1976). 
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policies has been the creation of subsidised entrepreneurs unable to compete in 
the international markets, and uninterested in the innovations.4 
Ciocca and Toniolo (1976) distinguish five sub-periods in the economic pol-
icy of Fascism: fiscal consolidation (1922-1925), ‘quota novanta’ (1926-1929), 
international crisis (1930-1932), autarchy (1933-1935), empire and preparation 
to war (1936-1939). The first period is associated with the free-market policy 
implemented by the finance minister Alberto De Stefani. The objectives were 
the reshaping of the industrial sector, the increase in productivity, the consoli-
dation of public finances, the improvement of trade balance, and price stability. 
The main instrument of this policy was the reduction of both nominal and real 
wages through the ‘Palazzo Chigi Agreement’ in 1923. 
However, price stability was missed: the excess demand due to investments 
led inflation to 19% in 1925 and to 5% in 1926. A depreciation of the Italian 
lira with respect to the sterling from 89.48 in June 1922 to 145 in July 1925 and 
154 in July 1926. This depreciation was contrasted with an appreciation to 90 
(the so-called ‘quota 90’), obtained through capital controls, increase in interest 
rates, the compulsory exchange of short-term bonds into long-term ones. These 
policies led to the appreciation of the lira as an anti-inflation device, however 
‘quota 90’ was more a narrative5 than a target, and it was an attempt to impose 
to the bourgeoisie, which preferred an exchange rate at 120, the decisions of 
the government (Toniolo 1980, 123). This deflationary policy was successful, 
at the cost of lower demand and employment. 
To counteract the depression in 1930-1932, the government used public 
works as an instrument to reduce unemployment and increase demand; moreo-
ver, it strengthen “cartelization” as a way to dampen the reduction of prices due 
to the fall in demand. In these years GDP is reduced by 15%, industrial produc-
tion by 19%, private consumption is stable, whereas public consumption in-
crease by 22%, and export is reduced by 29%. 
In the following period (1933-1935) autarchy became the norm: the import 
substitution policy increased the return on investments, cartels allowed higher 
prices and the low wage policy continued. From the point of view of the real 
sector the effect is positive, since in 1935 there is a rebound of the international 
                                                             
4  The consensus of the literature on the fascist economic policy, which we can identify with 
the book by Ciocca and Toniolo, is given by Bonelli et al. (1976). They claim that the policies 
were not substantially different from those implemented in other European countries and 
that in many circumstances it would have been impossible to design different policies. To 
some extent the critique by Bonelli e al. (1976) is even more fundamental, since the idea of 
“lazy capitalism” underlying this interpretation of the policies implemented by Fascism – in 
particular referred to the squeeze in wages – cannot be demonstrated. 
5  In the Pesaro speech in 1927 in which the “quota 90” was made public, Mussolini said: “The 
fascist regime is prepared to impose all the necessary sacrifices, but our lira, which is the 
symbol of the nation, the sign of our wealth, of our hard work, of our efforts, of our tears, 
of our blood, is defended and will be defended” (Cohen 1988, 103). 
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markets, and Italy increases its exports in the iron and steel, mechanic and 
chemical sectors. Growth is led by the need of increasing inventories and by 
investments in the sectors experiencing new domestic demand, therefore allow-
ing for more capital accumulation. From the point of view of financial markets, 
however, there were pressures on gold reserves that were tackled through fi-
nancial repression. 
The last period includes the Empire and war preparations, and fiscal policy 
needs to fund increased military expenditure: public expenditure doubles be-
tween 1936 and 1938. In turn, military expenditure leads the raise in demand 
(investments and inventories), which is supplemented by the devaluation of the 
lira (40-50% with respect to the sterling, the dollar and the mark in 1936) and 
higher exports. Government policy works mainly on the supply side: allotment 
of raw materials to war industries, use of domestic natural resources, and de-
velopment of techniques coherent with industrial and agricultural resources. 
Finally, there is also a migration policy towards Ethiopia, which was colonized 
in 1936. 
3.  The Cliometrics of Facsim 
The quantitative literature on economic history of fascism is quite old (Filosa et 
al. 1976; Del Monte 1977) and shows two main limits. First, it is mainly ob-
tained through descriptive statistics and not econometrics, and when such estima-
tions were attempted, they were extremely simple and contained some mistakes. 
Second, new production series are now available (Fenoaltea 2003) for 1861-
1913, which strongly modify the interpretation of the Italian development pro-
cess, in particular concerning the economic performance before the fascist rule. 
Filosa et al. (1976) built a structural model based on a keynesian-kaleckian 
model of the economy “in which income distribution to factors of production 
dominates in the short-term the formation of demand through consumption, and 
in the medium- long-term through accumulation and supply composition via 
investments. This hypothesis – which is not contradicted for the period after the 
Second World War, although the industrial base is more diversified and there is 
higher economic integration – is a fortiori more plausible for an antecedent 
stage of growth” (Filosa et al. 1976, 77-8, our translation). 
In looking for continuity/discontinuity between the economy before and af-
ter WWII, this analysis mirrors ours. However, it suffers from several limita-
tions: the time-span is very limited (1918-1938), and there are serious problems 
of spurious regressions, as suggested by the autocorrelation of the residuals and 
R2 very close to 1. Therefore, the estimates of the functions of private con-
sumption, labour demand, price equation, imports and exports – pointing to-
wards stability – should be taken cum grano salis. 
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The approach followed by Del Monte (1977) is similar to ours, since it en-
compassed the period from 1881 to 1961, and a specific emphasis is given to 
the comparison between the ‘Giolittian age’ (1897-1913) and the fascist rule 
(1920-1938). In this analysis the relationship between rates of accumulation 
and growth rates of profits is estimated, together with the relationship between 
the growth rate of output per capita and rates of accumulation, finding positive 
and significant coefficients. However, the conclusion is that the fascist eco-
nomic policy was unable to obtain higher profit rates, and that the government 
was allocating capital in an inefficient manner. In any case, two problems 
plague these results: a short number of observations, because averages of sub-
periods are used, and non-stationarity and cointegration issues, already noted 
for the previous contribution. 
4.  Methodology, Data and Results 
The empirical strategy of the paper is the following: first, we estimate the data 
generating process (DGP) of the capital stock, therefore we analyse the stability 
of this process over time. Possible discontinuities should be attributed to exog-
enous events or endogenous policy decisions. Historical analysis should pro-
vide explanations for these discontinuities. 
Data on capital stock are taken from Ercolani (1969) and are expressed in 
1938 lira. They are constructed according to the perpetual inventory method 
summing yearly investments and detracting a share of the existing stock be-
cause of depreciation. Figure 1 shows the capital stock from 1881 through 
1938. The series shows an upward trend, with a deceleration in the years of the 
First World War. In the econometric analysis data are in logs. 
Figure 1: Capital Stock, 1880-1939 
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To analyse the stochastic properties of the series we use two unit-root tests, 
ADF (Dickey and Fuller 1979) and KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992). In the 
former the null hypothesis is the series has a unit root and the alternative is that 
the series is stationary. In the KPSS test the null is stationarity whereas the 
alternative is a unit root. We estimate both statistics with a constant and a linear 
trend. To assess the autoregressive structure of the test we use the Akaike In-
formation Criterion. The results of both tests point to the same direction (Table 
1), showing as it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of unit root in the 
first test, and that stationarity is rejected at the 5% confidence level in the sec-
ond test. 
Table 1: Unit Root Test 
 
ADF KPSS 
Test Statistics Lag Test Statistics Lag 
Log Capital Stock -1.183 1 0.1582 1 
ADF critical values with trend are -3.96 (1%), -3.41 (5%) and -3.13 (10%). For the KPSS test 
they are 0.119 (10%), 0.146 (5%) and 0.216 (1%).  
 
Then, we need to determine whether the DGP of the capital stock is ARIMA. 
To estimate the order of the autoregressive polynomial (p) and of the moving 
average process (q) we use the Hannan and Rissanen (1982) test. Using the 
Akaike Information Criterion, we get p = 2 and q = 0. Therefore to represent 
the capital stock, we can estimate an AR(2) process in first differences (Lüt-
kepohl 2004). Table 2 gives the estimates of this process. The diagnostics tests 
are pretty good. Given the way in which the series is constructed, the auto-
regressive structure of the process is expected. 
Table 2: The AR Model 
Variable (1) 
AR(1)  1.815 [0.078] 
AR(2)     -0.842 [0.000] 
Const  0.064 [0.070] 
Portmanteau Test    3.4517 [0.750] 
Test LM for autocorrelation   1.4663 [0.917] 
Non-normality test     joint test      1.6858 [0.430] 
 symmetry 1.2364 [0.266] 
 kurtosis 0.4491 [0.503] 
ARCH-LM TEST  8.7544 [0.923] 
p-values are in brackets. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show the statistics CUSUM and CUSUM-SQ to analyse the 
stability over time of the estimates in column (3). The former statistics is al-
ways within the 5% area, whereas the latter shows a discontinuity on the years 
1905-1915. In both cases there are no discontinuities during the fascist rule. 
From an historical point of view there are several events that might have nega-
tively affected capital accumulation. First, the 1907 crisis, which lasted until 
HSR 39 (2014) 3  │  343 
1912, was due to over-production, and led to lower investments. Second, the 
Italo- Turkish War in 1911-1912 to seize Libya, which first raised public debt 
and then taxation, with the consequence of lowering returns and therefore capi-
tal accumulation. Besides these events, there was the First World War (Toniolo 
1988). 
Figure 2: CUSUM Test 
 
 
 
Figure 3: CUSUM-SQ Statistics 
 
 
 
Figure 4 and 5 show the recursive coefficients of the two autoregressive terms 
over time. In both cases we observe some changes in their size at the beginning 
of the period, possibly because the estimation is based on a limited number of 
observations,6 then the size tend to stabilise and from 1905 we cannot observe 
any discontinuity, in particular for the period in which the fascist government 
ruled the country. 
                                                             
6  Also note that the size of bands is larger first, and then tend to reduce as long as more 
observations are available, improving the quality of the estimates. 
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Figure 4: Recursive Co-Efficient for the AR (1) Term 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Recursive Co-Efficient for the AR (2) Term 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have analysed the capital accumulation process in Italy from 
1881 through 1938 to verify its stability. The economic literature on the history 
of fascism, maintains that the economic policies were meant to increase this 
factor of production through an increase in the rate of profits. On the one hand, 
a policy of nominal wage reduction was implemented; on the other hand, pro-
tection from international competition and establishment of oligopolies were 
applied. Had these policies been successful, we should have found a disconti-
nuity in the DGP with respect to the previous period. Instead, our analysis 
shows that the process is quite stable over time, and does not displays disconti-
nuities related with the policies implemented by the dictatorship. Therefore, we 
find evidence in favour of the interpretation of the economic history of fascism 
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put forward by Cohen (1988) and Lyttelton (1988), which claimed that fascism 
was not a developmentalist dictatorship. 
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